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Abstract In 2007 and the first half of 2008, a sharp rise in
agricultural commodity and food prices triggered grave
concerns about food security, malnutrition and increased
poverty. While the threat of a prolonged food-price shock
receded in the second half of 2008, many factors underlying
the price volatility are likely to persist, and will require
careful management if future food-price shocks are to be
avoided. This paper suggests three strategies that, together,
could reduce vulnerability to price shocks: (1) strengthen
safety nets, improve access to family planning services, and
promote education; (2) enhance domestic food production
and improve rural livelihoods through increased investment
in research and development to increase productivity; and
(3) reduce exposure to market volatility through more
efficient supply chains and better use of financial instru-
ments to hedge risk. The challenge of food security will
require a global response, involving governments, interna-
tional and regional funding and lending institutions, United
Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations, civil
society, and the private sector.
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Food price shocks: vulnerability, and underlying factors
Very high agricultural commodity prices in the first
6 months of 2008 raised concerns worldwide about
increased poverty and malnutrition. Since June 2008, prices
have fallen significantly, as a result of strong production
gains in developed countries (FAO 2008a), the world
financial crisis, lower oil prices, and a strengthening US
dollar. But many of the underlying factors causing high and
volatile prices still remain. Structural factors, such as
population and income growth.1 and biofuel demand, may
keep prices high in real terms.
Arab countries are vulnerable to fluctuations in interna-
tional commodity markets because they are heavily depen-
dent on imported food (Fig. 1). Most import at least 50% of
the food calories they consume (FAO 2008b). This raises
concerns about both price and supply. In terms of price,
1 In particular, income growth and greater demand for livestock
products in China and India have increased global demand for cereal
grain.
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high food prices strain household and national budgets. In
terms of supply, five exporters (Argentina, Australia,
Canada, the European Union, and the United States) supply
73% of the world’s traded cereals (FAO 2008b); supplies
are dependent on events in these countries and on Arab
countries’ relationships with them.
Factors driving food security risks
The food-price shock of 2008 was caused by the conver-
gence of multiple structural and cyclical factors.2 Projec-
tions by international agencies (OECD and FAO 2008;
World Bank 2008b) suggest a structural shift may prevent
prices from returning to pre-crisis levels. While this may or
may not be true, of greater concern for Arab countries is
that structural and cyclical forces are creating a system that
is very sensitive to supply shortfalls, making future price
shocks very probable. Food prices can increase surprisingly
rapidly; and the impacts are particularly severe because
both supply and demand are inelastic. Poor households
cannot quickly alter or reduce food consumption in
response to high prices. Neither can producers quickly
ramp up production in response to high prices, due to the
seasonal production cycle and the slow development of
new technologies.
Global productivity growth rates for major cereals are
slowing (Fig. 2). This is partly because public support for
agricultural research has decreased since 1990 (Ruttan
2002). Unless this trend is reversed, the likelihood of food-
price shocks will increase.
International cereal markets are thin; therefore relatively
small shifts in supply or demand can cause large shifts in
prices. Only 18% of world wheat production and 6% of
world rice production is exported; the rest is consumed
domestically (FAO 2008d). In 2008, some major exporters
banned rice and wheat exports for fear of domestic short-
ages. These bans contributed to the rapid price increases.
The thinner the market, the sharper the fluctuation in prices
and the higher the likelihood of future price shocks.
Low stock levels increase price sensitivity to disturban-
ces in demand and supply. Policy reform in recent years,
such as replacing price supports with direct farmer pay-
ments, has brought down stocks in Organisation for
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries from the
high levels of the 1980s and 1990s (Gardner and Sumner
2007; World Bank 2008a). Low stock levels, combined
with thin cereal markets and ever-increasing demand,
contribute to a just-in-time commodity market that is more
vulnerable to disruptions. The United Nations Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) forecasts global end-of-
season cereal stocks in 2008/09 at 474 million metric
tonnes, the highest since 2002/03 (FAO 2008a). As a result,
the cereal stock-to-use ratio is forecasted to rise slightly to
22%—but even so, the probability of price shocks remains
high when stocks dip below the 25–30% range.
Climate change will contribute to market thinness and
instability by increasing cereal yield volatility and possibly
reducing global cereal production. Climate change models
project an increasing probability of droughts and floods
Fig. 1 Arab countries are the largest net importers of cereals (million metric tons, 2007). Source: adapted from FAO (2008e)
2 Structural: long-term factors that cause a permanent shift in demand
or supply. Cyclical: short-term factors that induce a temporary shift in
supply or demand.
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worldwide (Cline 2007). A critical concern for Arab
countries is how often droughts and floods occur in key
cereal exporting regions. Research on the impact of global
warming on cereal production is not conclusive, but
average production is likely to decrease. Rosenzweig and
Parry (1996) estimate that global cereal production could
decrease by 5% from 1996 to 2060, even with moderate
investment in climate change adaptation.
Policies that promote biofuels such as ethanol and
biodiesel, coupled with high domestic tariffs that discour-
age biofuel imports, shift land away from food production
and pasture (FAO 2008e). There is evidence that this is
occurring in the United States, which accounts for 28% of
world cereal exports (Fig. 3). Fabiosa et al. (2008) suggest
that such policies in the USAwill probably transmit directly
to higher world-market prices for wheat and oilseeds.
Sustaining such policies in the future would contribute to
thinner wheat markets and an upward structural adjustment
in wheat prices. Similar biofuel policies in the European
Union, Canada, and elsewhere could affect the production
of wheat, coarse grains, oilseeds, sugar, and other crops.
Petroleum is the primary ingredient of two key agricul-
tural inputs, diesel and fertilizer. The cost of transporting
food also depends on the price of fuel. A recent study
indicates that when oil prices are above US$50 a barrel, oil
and food commodity prices move together, but when the oil
price falls below US$50, oil and food prices decouple
(World Bank 2009). If oil price shocks occur concurrently
with food price shocks, as they did in summer 2007, oil
producers will be partly insulated, while non oil-producers
will not.
This is not to say that oil-producing counties should not
be concerned with high food prices. Even when oil prices
are high, these countries typically have many competing
uses for oil revenues, and high food import costs reduce
governments’ ability to meet investment objectives. Rising
petroleum prices can also impact commodity prices by
increasing the demand for biofuels, which diverts cereals
and sugar from food to fuel (FAO 2008c).
Monetary policies, currency fluctuation, and financial
speculation may have also contributed to the 2008 shock.
Low interest rates reduce the price of storage and encourage
the buying and holding of commodities (Frankel 2008). The
recent decline of the US dollar against other hard currencies
increased the demand for these goods, since commodities
priced in dollars became cheaper in real terms. Financial
speculation may also have played a role. In times of
uncertainty and/or recession, investors shift to physical
assets including commodities. This leads to large increases
in non-traditional investments in commodity markets as
fund investors bet on continued price increases. However,
recent research (Carter et al. 2008) suggests that speculation
may be a symptom, not a cause, of the food-price shock.
Will food-price shocks continue to be a problem?
Population growth, urbanization, and income growth are
relatively strong in Arab countries and will increase the
demand for food. Supply-side constraints are also more
binding in most Arab countries than elsewhere because of
scarcity of water and arable land. Thin cereal markets and
climate change will increase price sensitivity to disturban-
ces in these demand and supply factors. The potential
decoupling of petroleum and food commodity prices may
affect the fiscal balances of oil-producing countries,
reducing their ability to cope with future shocks. It is not
known if world food prices will be high or low, but it is
certain that Arab countries will remain vulnerable to food
price and quantity shocks.
Food demand is increasing faster in Arab countries than
worldwide, largely due to structural factors. Population
growth rate in the Arab countries is projected to be 1.7%,
compared to 1.1% globally (World Bank 2008b).3 Income
growth, at 3–3.4%, is also faster than the global average
(World Bank 2008b).4 Urbanization is also increasing:
urban population in Arab countries grew by 3% during the
3 Population data are for the World Bank’s Middle East and North
Africa region (MENA).
4 Income as measured by annual percentage change in GDP per capita
PPP at constant 2005 international dollars from 2001–2007.
Fig. 2 Global growth rates of
yields of major cereals are
slowing: percentage change in
growth of yields, 1980–2005.
Source: FAO (2008b). Note:
Yield growth rates reported as
seven-year moving averages
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1990–2006 period, compared to the global average of 2.2%
(FAO 2008b).
Water and land constraints are particularly challenging.
Approximately 75% of exploitable renewable water resour-
ces in Arab countries are taken out of the natural system
and used, compared to between 1% and 30% in other
regions (World Bank 2007a). In some areas, non-renewable
sources such as fossil groundwater are being exploited.
Consequently, there is little or no potential for sustainable
increase in water use in most Arab countries. Expansion of
arable land is similarly limited. The annual growth rate of
arable and permanent cropland during 1995–2005 was
1.7% in Arab countries excluding Sudan, 6.7% including
Sudan, and 2.3% worldwide (FAO 2008b). In addition,
cereal yields have grown relatively slowly: from 1990 to
2007, average cereal yields increased by 14.5% in the Arab
region, compared to 21.5% worldwide.
The impact of price shocks on Arab economies
There are important lessons about the potential macro and
microeconomic effects of high food prices, and the results of
government responses. At the macro level, inflation in Arab
countries has increased more than twice as fast as world
inflation in recent years (IMF 2008). High energy and food
prices are driving factors, outpacing overall inflation by
several percentage points. High food prices also deteriorate
trade balances. Most Arab countries provide subsidies in
response to high food prices, but this can strain fiscal
balances (Fig. 4). Although food commodity prices have
fallen subsequently, they remain higher than pre-crisis levels,
and inflation remains a concern. The global financial crisis
and declining oil prices will significantly reduce the fiscal
balances of the wealthier oil-exporting Arab countries, and
their ability to absorb food-price shocks. At the micro level,
the price shock probably made poverty both more wide-
spread and more severe, although it is too early to determine
the exact damage. The poor are the most vulnerable, because
they spend the largest share of their budget on food. Food-
price shocks can push people above the poverty line into
poverty, and worsen the condition of those who are already
poor.
The impact of price shocks on government budgets
Non-oil-exporting countries face increasing fiscal pressure
due to the price shock. In addition to inflation, food-price
shocks directly affect trade and fiscal balances. Many Arab
countries (e.g., Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Yemen) have
increased public sector salaries and have tried to support the
poor by increasing bread subsidies, implementing direct cash
transfers, and lifting tariffs on basic food commodities.
However, these measures are not sustainable without concur-
rent increases in revenues. To finance the additional expendi-
tures, oil-poor countries may be forced to reduce other
essential expenditures or increase borrowing, which could
Fig. 3 Biofuel policies in the
USA may contribute to substi-




Fig. 4 Oil-poor countries have
fiscal deficits, while oil-rich
countries have surpluses (2007
balances). Source: World Bank
(2008b). * Syria, Yemen and
Egypt are oil exporters, but their
production and net exports are
small compared to the oil-rich
countries
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damage economies in the long term. Non-oil-exporters that
rely significantly on cereal imports (Jordan, Lebanon,
Morocco, and Djibouti) all have fiscal and trade deficits,
contributing to economic hardship. However, rising revenues
from other commodity exports have eased some of the burden
in oil-poor countries that are rich in other natural resources.
For example, Morocco’s phosphate exports tripled in value in
2008 and covered the oil deficit, while Jordan’s export of
potash helped cushion its food-import bills.
Oil-rich countries have been able to maintain fiscal
surpluses, raise public sector wages and implement large
food subsidy programs despite high food prices. However,
the recent decline in oil prices may reduce trade surpluses,
foreign exchange earnings, government revenues, and
investment options in these countries. If oil prices continue
to decline but food prices remain high, fiscal and trade
surpluses could become chronic deficits.
Across-the-board food subsidy programs can create a
substantial fiscal burden. Food-price shocks drive up the cost
of government food subsidies. But a common government
response to shocks is to increase the coverage and size of these
subsidies, driving up costs even further. In countries such as
Syria and Egypt, which have across-the-board subsidies, the
subsidies exceed 1% of GDP and could become a major fiscal
problem if commodity prices stay high, or in the event of
future price shocks (Fig. 5).5 While social and political
considerations may make it hard to rationalize food
subsidies, this paper outlines potential strategies to improve
performance and reduce the fiscal burden.
The impact of price shocks on poverty
Rural poverty is at the core of Arab countries’ food-security
problems. About one quarter of the population of Arab
countries is poor, and 76% of these live in rural areas.
Poverty rates in rural areas are also dropping more slowly
than in urban areas (IFAD and FAO 2007). Table 1 shows
rural and urban poverty rates in countries for which data are
available. Clearly, there is a need for social safety nets
designed to reach the poor; this is discussed later.
Higher food prices contribute to the incidence, depth,
and severity of poverty. The poor are hit hardest by food-
price shocks, because they spend between 35% and 65% of
their income on food. Rough calculations suggest that,
barring economic growth, a 30% increase in food prices in
Egypt would have resulted in a 12 percentage point
increase in poverty. In Morocco, a 14% increase in food
prices would have resulted in a 4 percentage point increase
in poverty. In Djibouti a 21% increase in the food consumer
price index (CPI) could have pushed extreme poverty up by
14 percentage points.6 These are severe impacts, reflecting
a characteristic feature of the region: with a relatively high
concentration of people living near the poverty line,
poverty numbers are very sensitive to even small increases
in the cost of living (World Bank 2006).
Higher food prices will affect some groups more than
others. The worst affected will be the urban poor, the rural
landless, and small and marginal farmers. Large farmers
will be partially buffered since they are likely to benefit
from higher produce prices (FAO 2008f). In contrast, a
large proportion of small farmers in several Arab countries
stand to lose from higher food prices because they are net
consumers of food. Preliminary findings from Yemen are
alarming. Between 2006 and 2008 the percentage of under-
nourished people in the surveyed population rose from 24%
to 59% (World Food Program 2008). In order to help
marginal groups become food secure, employment oppor-
tunities must be generated. Strategies to create economic
activity in rural areas are dealt with in a separate section.
5 This pales in comparison to energy subsidies, which average 7% of
GDP across the region (World Bank 2008j).
Fig. 5 Food subsidies are a
high share of GDP in some
countries (2007). Source: World
Bank (2008b)
6 These figures are from simulations and represent maximum possible
effects. They refer to the changes in food prices (or food component of
the CPI) during the period pre-crisis (2005) to early 2008, assuming
no income growth and no substitution away from food. They do not
take into account possible benefits of higher food prices on farmers’
incomes.
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Smallholder farmers usually form the majority of the rural
population and the rural poor. Enabling smallholders to
become more productive improves household food security,
and in turn national food security. Therefore, successful
smallholder farming should also be recognized as a food
security goal (IFAD and FAO 2007; FAO 2008f). The need to
invest in smallholder agriculture will be discussed further.
For some groups, the impact of the food-price shock may
endure even after prices drop. Households in extreme poverty
may sacrifice productive inputs to purchase food, reducing
their earning potential in the following year. For example, in
Yemen 10% of surveyed farmers consumed their seed stocks
for food (World Food Program 2008). Some poor households
are undoubtedly forgoing health and education expenditures
in order to feed themselves, sacrificing the productivity of
future generations. The same study in Yemen showed that
39% of surveyed households reduced their expenditures on
health (World Food Program 2008).
Food security, resource endowments, and fiscal balances
Exposure to food price and quantity risk is a function of
fiscal balances and dependence on cereal imports. Arab
countries are price takers and import dependent, and are
thus exposed to substantial price and quantity risk. Price
risk is the risk that prices will be prohibitively high, making
purchase difficult even though supplies are available on
world markets. Quantity risk is the risk of food not being
available, even if there are sufficient funds for purchase.
Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between import depen-
dence, fiscal balance, and risk. Import-dependent countries
with strong fiscal balances (e.g., the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries) are less vulnerable to price risk,
but are concerned about quantity risk stemming from export
bans and other trade restrictions.
GCC countries are most vulnerable to food-price shocks
when oil prices are low and food commodity prices are
high. Depletion of oil reserves will reduce their ability to
cushion the impact of future food-price shocks. Cyclical
factors such as falling demand for oil are contributing to the
recent decline in oil prices, reducing oil exporters’ incomes.
Structural factors driven by Western concerns about energy
security and global warming may contribute to a longer-
term slump in oil prices. These factors could decouple oil
and food commodity prices, making it more difficult for oil-
rich countries to offset terms of trade losses, which occur
when a country’s balance of trade deteriorates.7
Djibouti, Yemen, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, and Lebanon
are most vulnerable because they face both high quantity and
high price risk.8 Price risk is a problem because weak fiscal
balances constrain government financing options. Quantity
risk is a problem because of high dependence on imports.
These countries may need external support to address food
security challenges because they lack the fiscal resources to
handle shocks.
Sudan, Egypt, and Syria face low quantity risk (less
dependent on imports) but high price risk (weak fiscal
balances). While these countries are less dependent on
imports, they have food-subsidy programs that weaken their
fiscal balances. The following section presents strategies to
make these programs cheaper and more effective.
No Arab country is protected from future food-price
shocks. Each country needs to assess how much price and
quantity risk it can tolerate, and how much it can afford to
mitigate, and thus devise a strategy to minimize the impact
Country % of urban who are poor % of rural who are poor % of poor in rural areas
Yemena 21 40 84
Djiboutia 39 83 31
Egypta 10 27 78
Sudanb 27 85 81
West Bank and Gazaa 21 55 67
Jordana 12 19 29
Syria 8 15 62
Algeriaa 10 15 52
Mauritaniac 30 50 78
Moroccoa 5 15 69
Tunisiaa 2 8 75
Table 1 The poor are
concentrated in rural areas
(various years)
aWorld Bank (2008d)
b IFAD and FAO (2007)
cWorld Bank (2008b)
Poverty as determined by
national poverty line
8 In Tunisia, for example, it is estimated that food trade balance fell
from 277 million Dinars surplus in 2006 to 427 million deficit in
2007; import coverage went down from 121% to 79%. The country
imported 296,600 t of wheat in January and February 2008, 11.8%
less than in the same period in 2007, but at twice the cost.
Disbursements under the Caisse de Compensation were 575 million
Dinars in 2007 (1.3% of GDP) against 321 million Dinars in 2006.
7 This is a long-term risk since fossil fuel substitutes remain
expensive. Oil-rich countries can reduce their vulnerability by using
current oil revenues to diversify their economies to reduce dependence
on oil revenues.
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of future price shocks. Such a strategy would address the
growth in food demand, increase domestic production, and
manage exposure to price volatility. At the same time,
countries can reduce fiscal pressure by designing more
efficient safety nets.
Components of food security strategies
Any food security strategy must first address the issue of
demand growth. Food-price shocks will be catastrophic for
the younger generation if they lead to reduced household
investment in health, nutrition, and education. Effective safety
nets are crucial. But creating financially sustainable safety
nets that assist households in greatest need, requires improved
targeting and flexibility, so that safety net programs can be
scaled up or down as needed. Other components of a strategy
are better access to family planning services, and educating
people about health and nutrition.
Current protection measures
Arab governments responded to the recent price shock with a
combination of trade policies, wage increases, and safety-net
programs (Table 2). Trade- and tax-policy changes have been
a common initial response, aimed at increasing food security
and controlling consumer prices. Morocco reduced wheat
tariffs substantially and provided subsidies to wheat import-
ers. Egypt banned rice exports. Syria imposed export
restrictions and reduced taxes on food grains. Djibouti
eliminated consumption taxes on several food staples and
is providing limited food assistance to rural families through
donor support. Tunisia reduced taxes on wheat and is
keeping price controls on strategic staples. Yemen is
temporarily providing wheat subsidies, and Jordan is
maintaining bread subsidies.9 Public-sector wages have been
increased in several countries including Jordan, Egypt, Syria,
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Oman, largely as ‘compensation’
for higher energy and food prices. Some countries have used
cash transfers to increase the purchasing power of the poor.10
Egypt recently expanded its small cash-transfer program.
Yemen has created a workfare program building on an
infrastructure-based social fund and is reforming and expand-
ing its cash-transfer program. Many of these actions will be
difficult to remove or scale back. Increasing public-sector
wages is a permanent and untargeted response, fueling
inflationary pressure. When recipients become accustomed to
the benefits of maintaining or, as in the case of Egypt,
expanding food subsidies or rations, it can be very difficult to
remove them, even if market prices fall. In the wake of the
recent global financial crisis, Arab governments are expected to
reduce food subsidies further—creating additional challenges.
Many countries in the region (Egypt, Jordan, Syria,
Morocco, and others) rely on food subsidies as the primary
safety net. In-kind food subsidies are particularly popular
and many countries expanded these subsidies in 2008 and
Fig. 6 Arab countries with high
cereal import dependence and
large fiscal deficits are the most
vulnerable at macro level
(2007 fiscal balance as
percentage of GDP from IMF
data, 2005 cereal balance in
metric tons from FAOSTAT
data). Sources: adapted from
FAO (2008b), IMF (2008),
World Bank (2008b). Note:
cereal import dependency
measured by net imports/total
consumption
9 Jordan eliminated other food and energy subsidies as part of broader
reform.
10 Cash transfers can be unconditional, given to everyone who qualifies
based on predetermined criteria, or conditional, where cash is given in
exchange for behavior modification (e.g., sending children to school).
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2009. While energy subsidies constitute by far the largest
safety-net component in most countries, food subsidies
absorb up to 2% of GDP in some cases (Fig. 6).11 Subsidies
have several disadvantages. First, they divert resources
from alternative, more productive uses. Second, when they
are not targeted, they are unnecessarily expensive, because
most benefits are captured by the non-poor.12 And third,
food distribution systems entail heavy administrative
overhead, substantial storage losses, and encourage corrup-
tion, waste, and leakage of food to non-human uses.
Existing safety nets do not reach those most in need;
they need to be better targeted. Most cash-transfer programs
in the region are small, costing less than 1% of GDP. Most
programs target by category: households and individuals
are entitled to benefits if they fall into eligible categories,
such as single mother, widow, unemployed, elderly, or
disabled. These categories are not limited to the poor, and
do not necessarily cover the poorest households. For
example, Egypt’s social-assistance program covers less
than 12% of the poor; in 2008 it was estimated that
between 48% and 60% of the benefits leaked to the non-
poor (World Bank 2008k). In Yemen in 2005, the Social
Welfare Fund cash-transfer program reached only 13% of
the poor. Of those who received transfers, 70% were not in
the target group. The National Aid Fund in Jordan covered
less than 20% of the eligible population in 2005, and of
those who received aid, only 14% were actually eligible.
Minimizing the impact of price shocks
Arab countries can improve the design of safety nets to
minimize the impacts of food-price shocks and prevent
them from doing permanent harm. Simulations indicate that
a sharp drop in poverty headcount, depth, and severity
would be possible in many countries if category-based
transfers are replaced with transfers targeted through a
proxy-means test13 coupled with geographic targeting
(World Bank 2009). Proxy-means testing is usually effec-
tive in identifying the chronic long-term poor. Poverty
alleviation can be strengthened by increasing the budget for
such programs, rather than generalized subsidies. Most
Arab countries have the datasets required for targeting, and
many are already adopting or considering this approach.
Cash transfers can protect those most in need, and may
be more cost effective than in-kind subsidies. In compar-
ison to in-kind subsidies, cash transfers do not distort
commodity markets, typically have lower administrative
costs, and allow beneficiaries to choose what to purchase.
Payment systems can be designed to limit leakages.
Conditional cash transfers14 are a viable option. For
example, transfers could be made conditional on a child
attending school.15 Brazil’s Bolsa Familia and Mexico’s
Progresa/Oportunidades are examples of successful large-
scale conditional cash-transfer programs.
Table 2 Arab countries used various economy-wide policies and existing social protection programs to address the price shock

















Egypt √ √ √ √
Morocco √ √ √ √
Tunisia √ √ √ √
Yemen √ √ √ √
Lebanon √ √ √
Syria √ √ √ √ √ √
Jordan √ √ √ √
West Bank and Gaza √ √ √ √
Iraq √ √ √ √ √ √
Djibouti √ √ √ √
World Bank (2008b)
12 Yemtsov (2008) estimates that in Egypt a person in the richest
quintile receives three times the subsidies compared to a person in the
poorest quintile. In Morocco the poor receive 10% of what the
government spends on universal price subsidies; 90% goes to
subsidized goods consumed by the non-poor.
11 In 2006–2007, energy subsidies were more than 11% in Syria and
7% in Egypt.
13 Proxy-means testing is based on a set of observable characteristics
that are correlated with poverty. Beneficiaries are identified based on
these characteristics, not through direct income measures.
14 Cash assistance is provided to poor families conditional on behavior,
e.g., keeping children in school or maintaining health regimes.
15 The World Food Programme’s school-feeding programs in Yemen
targets girls’ schools, and has had a significant impact in improving
school attendance (IRIN 2005).
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Countries can strengthen such programs in various ways.
At the policy level, better coordination can reduce over-
lapping beneficiaries and mandates. For example, safety
nets in the West Bank and Gaza are provided through a
number of programs supported by the government, inter-
national donors, NGOs, and charitable organizations, some
of which have the same target populations. At the program
level, payment mechanisms, administrative operations and
staffing can be improved. Egypt is piloting an electronic
‘smart’ card for its ration system that will eventually
include cash transfers and other benefits such as health
insurance. The smart card can be used to track and
distribute benefits through banks. However, implementation
may be difficult in rural areas, where card usage is limited
by lack of education or infrastructure.
Safety nets must be flexible enough to be scaled up
when shocks strike and scaled down when they recede. If
possible, existing targeted cash-transfer programs should be
the prime candidates to be scaled up. These include
poverty-focused social assistance, as well as social pen-
sions, unemployment assistance, and disability pensions.
Where public workfare is already part of the safety net, it
may be useful to expand program reach. The next most
desirable candidate would be food stamps or other near-
cash assistance that could be targeted and scaled up or
down. Direct subsidies and food distribution would be the
least desirable option, advisable only when food markets
are functioning poorly or when subsidies are the only
available safety net.
Access to family-planning services must be improved.
Arab countries have extremely high population growth
rates; their combined population rose from 73 million in
1950 to 333 million currently, and is expected to reach
nearly 600 million by 2050. Higher incomes, urbanization,
and education can contribute to long-term reductions in
birth rates. Access to family planning services has also
proven to be highly effective in reducing population growth
rates, for example in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco,
and Tunisia. Widespread provision of family planning
services in Jordan, Mauritania, Yemen, and other countries
with high population growth could have multiple long-term
benefits, including food security.
Finally, Arab countries can educate families about the
benefits of a balanced diet. Diets will improve as incomes
increase, but this trend can be accelerated through educa-
tion programs targeting children and women (the latter play
a key role in determining the composition of household
diets). A primary objective of such programs would be to
make people aware of the nutritional composition of staple
foods. For example, 40–45% of the nutritious value of
white flour products, from vitamins to fiber, is lost during
bleaching and other processes. Education programs could
highlight the benefits of whole wheat flour over white flour.
Optimizing investment to increase productivity
and profitability
Any food-security strategy must aim to increase agricultural
productivity. Higher productivity can increase the purchas-
ing power of the rural poor, increase foreign-exchange
earnings, and reduce import dependence. Arab countries
have little room for expansion of arable land or irrigation,
so the emphasis must be on increasing productivity and
value per unit of land and water. This will require
investment in research, extension, and technology transfer.
The role of productivity
Productivity gains will remain critical to meeting increasing
demand for food. The evidence presented in “Food price
shocks: vulnerability, and underlying factors” suggests that
there are a number of persistent structural factors that may
keep agricultural commodity prices high in the future.
However, it may be useful to look at prices over the last
100 years (Fig. 7). Since the early 1900s, real wheat prices in
the USA have fallen, due to expansion and technological
change. In the 19th and the first half of the 20th century,
food output increased primarily due to an expansion of the
area planted. In the second half of the 20th century, the
increase came mostly from intensification (Evans 1998).
Agricultural land continues to expand, but the rate of
expansion has slowed. Similarly, decompositions of produc-
tivity gains suggest that research and development have been
the major drivers of growth since the 1960s. Productivity
gains from the Green Revolution eased high food prices after
the 1970 oil shock. However, as prices declined through the
first half of this decade, so did worldwide investment in
agricultural research and development (World Bank 2008e).
Making the most of scarce water resources
Non-agricultural water demand is growing rapidly. Today
approximately 85% of all abstracted surface water and
groundwater in Arab countries is already used for irrigation,
and this number must decrease. Although some advances
have been made, creating new water for large-scale irrigation
using desalination is not yet economically viable for most
agricultural activities (Beltrán et al. 2004; Chaibi 2000;
Medina 2004; Veza 2004). The use of treated wastewater
to irrigate food crops can also be problematic, because it
often encounters public resistance, although this is changing
(World Bank 2007a, b). Using wastewater to irrigate non-
food crops should still be encouraged, because it frees up
water for other uses. Water harvesting (capturing runoff flow
after rainfall events) is another viable option. It is important to
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recognize that desalination, wastewater recycling, and water
harvesting have their limits. Together they could amount to
20–25% of abstracted water, but they come at a high cost.
Policies that lower farmers’ water costs encourage non-
beneficial and low-value use. Water and energy subsidies that
reduce the price of water encourage farmers not to maximize
the value of water (World Bank 2007a, b). First, water is lost
when flood irrigation is used instead of water-saving irrigation
systems like sprinklers and drip. Second, farmers choose crops
with low value added per drop of water. For example,
vegetable production yields six times more value added per
drop of water than wheat production, and ten times more than
beef production. When farmers are encouraged to pay the full
cost of water, they voluntarily switch their use of irrigated land
from low-value crops such as wheat to higher-value crops such
as fruits and vegetables. In addition, they have incentives to
invest in water-saving irrigation technologies.
Encouraging farmers to replace cereals with high-value
crops has mixed implications for food security.16 The
World Bank’s World Development Report (2008e) argues
that the top agricultural priority for most Arab countries is
to diversify production out of staples and into high-value
crops (fruits and vegetables) for export. High-value crop
production gives landowners more entrepreneurial oppor-
tunities, creates more employment for women and landless
workers, and raises agricultural wages. In countries that
have a mix of rainfed and irrigated agriculture, such as the
Maghreb countries, the Mashreq, and Sudan, water pricing
could create a natural split: cereals would be grown primarily
under rainfed conditions, and high-value crops under
irrigation. This would increase dependence on imported
cereals, but would also generate more foreign exchange from
high-value crop exports that would cover the cost of
additional cereal imports. This would also be more profitable
for farmers and leave them disposable income to buy staples.
Any effort to convert cereal land to high value crops must
also ensure that farmers have access to domestic or export
markets to sell these crops. This is not to say that countries
that depend entirely on irrigation should stop growing cereal
where it is economically viable and sustainable, as in the Nile
Basin of Egypt. In Gulf countries, where irrigation water is
more limited, cereal production might be eliminated com-
pletely in favor of more efficient high-value crops.
Arab countries will need to import much of their cereal,
even in cases when they produce some domestically. There is
a complex balance of advantages and sacrifices involved in
either importing less cereal, or havingmore agricultural export
earnings with which to import. The tradeoffs—which are
different in each country—must be carefully evaluated when
considering water policy that shapes production choices.
Investing in rainfed agriculture
Despite predominately dry climates, many Arab countries
depend mainly on rainfed agriculture. In Algeria, Iraq,
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan,
Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen, rainfed agriculture is practiced
on more than half of all arable land (AOAD 2007). In the
Maghreb, Sudan, and Yemen, at least 80% of cereal
production is rainfed. In the Mashreq, half to two-thirds
of cereal production is rainfed (FAO 2008b).
Rainfed agriculture in Arab countries is in danger due to
climate change. Climate change models indicate that
average yearly rainfall could decrease by 10% in the next
50 years (World Bank 2008f). Droughts and heat waves
will become more frequent as weather cycles speed up. As
a result, rainfed yields will fluctuate increasingly over time,
and average yields will decrease by 20% in Arab countries
overall and almost 40% in Algeria and Morocco (World
Bank 2007a). It is usually the most marginalized farmers
and herders who depend most on rainfed agriculture,
particularly in the drier areas. These groups will be further
impoverished by climate change.
Helping rainfed farmers adapt to climate change requires
investment in new technologies. Research on conventionally
bred and genetically modified drought-resistant crops is
essential for keeping rainfed agriculture economically viable
Fig. 7 Historically, wheat pri-
ces have fallen. Source: USDA
(2008a)
16 For a simple model to assess national food security tradeoffs between
maintaining high levels of cereal self-sufficiency and converting cereal
land to high value export crops, see Magnan et al. (2009).
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(El Obeidy 2006). Conservation tillage has the potential to
increase and stabilize yields in drought-prone areas (World
Bank 2008e). Trials on rainfed wheat in Morocco have shown
higher and more stable yields under conservation tillage,
compared to conventional tillage (Mrabet 2002, 2008).
Increasing productivity through research
and development
Arab countries can increase public investment in agricul-
tural research and development. They currently invest
approximately $1.4 billion annually (Pardey et al. 2006),
or 0.66% of agricultural GDP (Alston et al. 2000).17 This is
slightly higher than the developing-country average of
0.53%, but far below the recommended level of 2% of
agricultural GDP (Gana et al. 2008), or the developed-
countries average of 2.36% (Alston et al. 2000). Besides the
atypical Bahrain, which invests 18% of its small agricul-
tural GDP in research and development (R&D), regional
leaders are Libya, Jordan, and Morocco (Table 3). It is not
only developed countries that invest highly in agricultural
R&D; Brazil invests 1.7% of agricultural GDP, 1.4% of
which is invested through government agencies (FAO
2008b). Arab countries increased spending on agricultural
R&D by only 0.05% of agricultural GDP from 1981 to
2000, whereas developed countries increased their spending
by 0.95% (World Bank 2008e).18
Arab countries need to enhance incentives for agricul-
tural researchers. The number of agricultural researchers is
relatively high, but they are under-funded and ill-equipped.
In 1999, there were 14 full-time agricultural researchers per
100,000 rural residents (Table 3). Leaders in this respect are
atypical Bahrain, with 457 researchers per 100,000 rural
residents, Libya, with 83, and Lebanon, with 66.19 This
compares well with agriculturally developed countries such as
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico (Table 3). However, funding
per researcher in Arab countries is much lower, and other
resources such as information technology infrastructure and
support staff are often limited (Gana et al. 2008; Casas et al.
1999). In addition, academic and teaching institutions
generally offer better incentives than agricultural research
institutes, and are better able to attract PhD holders.
Arab countries can develop innovative strategies that
encourage private-sector investment in agricultural R&D.
Since agricultural research produces mainly public goods, it
is difficult to stimulate private investment. Nevertheless, the
investment climate cane be strengthened in several ways,
especially through stronger intellectual property rights for
improved varieties and other innovations. In Latin America,
competitive funding for R&D has become common. Private
firms are allowed to compete for public funds, which they
can use to conduct research with private co-financing.
Another method is to offer rewards for certain innovations,
such as drought-resistant wheat varieties, that are developed
by the private sector. Yet another is to encourage innovation
by letting farmers apply for grants to implement new
technologies. This type of grassroots, farmer-led R&D has
spurred technology dissemination and increased incomes in
several countries, including Albania (World Bank 2008i).
Ultimately, a partnership between public, private, and
farmer-led research will be required to enhance R&D in
Arab countries (World Bank 2008e).
Lastly, countries can promote a multilateral, common
research agenda. The League of Arab States (LAS) and the
United Nations Development Program recommend a
regional R&D fund with a committed long-term budget
(LAS-UNDP 2008). The inability to capture returns to
research from beneficial spillovers is a major consequence
of underinvestment at the national level (Alston 2002).
Because many Arab countries share the same agricultural
goals (primarily food security) and challenges (such as water
scarcity and climate change), a common multi-nation
research agenda could increase the number of beneficiaries.
The International Center for Agricultural Research in Dry
Areas (ICARDA) has a mandate that covers most Arab
countries. The Arab Center for the Studies of Arid Zones and
Dry Lands (ACSAD), established by LAS in 1968, has a
mandate similar to ICARDA and covers all Arab countries.
An independent Arab agriculture fund could work with
ICARDA, ACSAD, national research centers, and other
organizations to achieve shared objectives.
Dissemination of knowledge
Arab countries need to couple R&D investments with better
extension. Agricultural extension in Arab countries is poor.
In the poorest countries—Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen—it
is virtually non-existent. A successful extension program
must reach large and small farmers alike. Large farmers
have the greatest productive potential per farmer, and the
ability to invest in relatively expensive new technologies.
Smallholders produce less food per hectare and per farmer,
but make up a large proportion of the target population;
extension’s biggest failure has been not providing them
with basic information (Gana et al. 2008). Smallholders
often struggle to compete because they lack basic technical
and marketing information. They require extension support
to produce and market crops, and generate economic
opportunities through value addition and other means.19 Bahrain’s relatively small rural population inflates this figure.
18 There are signs of improvement. Qatar, Tunisia, and UAE have
recently been promoting public sector research and development
(Gana et al. 2008).
17 Around 0.5% goes to national laboratories, the rest to other public
sector research institutions.
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Household assets, land, physical capital, education, and
health, are crucial factors in the ability of farmers to secure
rural livelihoods and to participate and compete in
agricultural markets (World Bank 2008e). Enhancing access
to these assets is critical to improving purchasing power and
will require significant public investment. A range of options
could be used: developing rural infrastructure, improving
product markets and access to financial services, strength-
ening producer organizations, and arranging payments for
environmental services.
Reducing exposure to market volatility
Even if Arab countries can successfully address demand and
productivity issues, they will remain net importers of cereals,
and will therefore be exposed to the risks of thin markets and
high prices. Reducing exposure to cereal-import volatility is
the third pillar of the food-security strategy. A number of risk
management strategies are available, each with advantages
and disadvantages. Each country faces a different mix of
quantity and price risk, depending on domestic production
potential and natural resource endowments. Each country
therefore needs its own tailor-made risk management strategy.
Ensuring stable, affordable, cereal supplies
A comprehensive review of national cereal procurement
methods may reveal simple ways to generate substantial
savings. For example, procurement legislation and methods
may be inflexible, outdated, or costly. Yemen, for instance,
does not consider price or use analytical measures to
determine quantity when issuing tenders, instead simply
scaling up from previous years (World Bank 1995). Modern
procurement systems include electronic tendering, bidding,
credit, and transaction-risk mitigation.
Legislative and organizational changes in procurement
rules can create immediate and substantial benefits. Arab
countries are the world’s single largest group of importers. By
relaxing national policies prohibiting multinational procure-
ment, they could generate economies of scale and reduce risk.
Another reason they do not always receive the best prices and
definitive quantities is that they do not use formal risk markets
to insure transactions as much as OECD countries, China,
India, and other emerging economies. Large transactions
present substantial risk, and in a world of limited supply and
competitive procurement, Arab countries are at a considerable
disadvantage compared to countries that hedge risk. It is
possible to overcome this by partnering with large, experi-
enced multinational companies, or by using financial markets
to insure transactions (World Bank 2008g).
Poor logistics are another problem. Supply chain logistics
are particularly important for reducing costs and improving
distribution. Ultimately, this gives consumers more food at
lower prices. The GCC countries place well in the World
Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (Table 4), but poorly
compared to other high-income countries. A possible
explanation is that because oil exports are so dominant,
there has been little pressure from the private sector for trade
and transport reform. There is great variation in logistics









Algeria 575 14 8 0.4
Bahrain 32 3 457 17.9
Egypt 6710 68 27 0.5
Iraq 770 – 30 –
Jordan 198 6 35 1.2
Lebanon 83 4 66 0.4
Libya 261 13 83 1.6
Morocco 606 40 6 0.9
Sudan 595 3 3 0.1
Syria 1058 15 22 0.4
Tunisia 368 15 16 0.6
UAE 73 – 46 –
Yemen 245 6 3 0.8
Arab world 11,574 187 14 0.5
Brazil 3943 924 11 1.4
Argentina 1858 270 45 1.0
Mexico 3097 357 12 1.6
Table 3 Agriculture research
and funding in national agricul-
tural research institutions
Casas et al. (1999); IFPRI 2008a
a A potential researcher-year is
the equivalent of one year’s
research. This unit is used
because many researchers also
do teaching, extension and
consulting, in effect making
them part-time researchers
– data not available
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countries worldwide, whereas Mauritania is in the top half
and is ranked sixth among low-income countries. Despite
close ties with the EU, Morocco performs far more poorly
than Tunisia. Both countries implemented exemplary cus-
toms and port reforms, but Tunisia was quicker to improve
domestic logistics like trucking and warehousing, and also
established an electronic data exchange to simplify customs
clearance (World Bank 2007b).
Improved monitoring of world and regional cereal
supply and demand will help foresee price shocks, allowing
countries to adjust imports accordingly. Although it was
impossible to imagine the full magnitude of the 2008 food-
price shocks, some of the causal factors would have been
picked up by appropriate monitoring systems. Production
and stock projections for the major wheat-producing
countries are readily available. For instance, the United
States Department of Agriculture publishes monthly pro-
jections of wheat production, stocks, and prices. Arab
policymakers would benefit from the introduction of
systems to collect and assimilate real-time information.
Monitoring domestic supply and demand is challenging
because rural people are widely dispersed. By the time it is
known that local stocks or production are too low, it could be
too late to avert a crisis. The League of Arab States proposes a
regional food security monitoring and early warning system
that will help determine the quantity and location of assistance
needed in response to a food shortage (LAS-UNDP 2008).
Such a system could collaborate with global institutions that
already monitor food supply.20 The creation of weather
stations will help predict where shortages may occur, and
what quantities of cereal will be needed to stabilize prices
(World Bank 2008c, h). Local information can then be
aggregated to estimate the quantity of imports needed, and
identify areas where it will be most needed.
Stockpiling strategies
Countries need to tailor their stockpiling strategies to their
specific needs. Food stocks serve multiple purposes: as rapid
emergency food aid in times of crisis, as working stocks for
regular distribution, and as buffer stocks to stabilize domestic
prices (Dorosh 2008).21 Each country must assess their
needs, based on national consumption, variability of domes-
tic production, storage costs, size of the country relative to
the international market, risks of production shortfalls and
high prices, and thinness of international markets. For
example, Morocco and Syria would need to gauge
domestic production based on rainfall at critical times
during the growing season, and adjust their stockpiles
accordingly. Since production varies by region within
these countries, they would also need to transport stocks
internally. In contrast, UAE and Bahrain know the
quantity they will have to import (100%) without
considering domestic production. Their stockpiling strat-
egy would focus on world production and on buying and
stocking when quantities are high and prices are low.
Since these countries are small, they could conceivably
hold their stocks at a central location. Alternatively, they
could hold stocks in a neighboring country, like Saudi
Arabia, with better infrastructure.
Countries can employ financial risk-hedging instruments
as a complement to physical stockpiling. Financial instru-
ments can be used to create virtual stockpiles, ensuring
cereals at a certain price without many of the costs
associated with physical stockpiles. These methods avoid
the high cost of physical stockpiles of perishable materi-
als.22 Financial instruments also improve budget planning
by allowing importing countries to lock in prices ahead of
time. The two primary financial instruments used to
establish virtual stockpiles are futures contracts and
options.23 Some importers continue to use conventional
contracts with established suppliers, while using futures and
options as an added price-security measure.
20 The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
Famine Early Warning System, FAO, and WFP collaborate with local
institutions worldwide to monitor potential food shortages.
21 Every level of the supply chain uses stockpiling to improve food
security. Farmers—whether they are net consumers or net buyers—
stockpile if they think prices will rise. Urban consumers stockpile in
times of expected scarcity. Large corporations and governments
stockpile to take advantage of high prices or depress prices on
domestic markets (World Bank 2008h).
Table 4 Logistics performance index: world rankings
Country World rank (of 150) Country World rank (of 150)
UAE 20 Mauritania 67
Bahrain 36 Morocco 94
Saudi Arabia 41 Egypt 97
Kuwait 44 Lebanon 98
Qatar 46 Yemen 112
Oman 48 Somalia 127
Jordan 52 Syria 135
Tunisia 60 Algeria 140
Sudan 61 Djibouti 145
World Bank (2007b)
22 Deterioration, handling, transport, rotation (constant procurement
and off-take), and opportunity cost of capital all pose economic
barriers to stockpiling. Bigger stocks lead to bigger distributions
programs and a larger fiscal deficit (Dorosh 2008).
23 Options on a terminal market offer more flexibility than futures;
they insure the buyer against higher prices, but if the material is not
required, there is no obligation to take it. A futures contract on a well-
regulated terminal market can act as an insurance policy.
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Alternative risk management strategies
Arab investors are increasingly buying or leasing land in
poor but land-abundant countries to secure their food
supply. This strategy is often described as a win-win. The
investor country acquires land and guaranteed access to the
food produced on it, while reaping high financial returns to
its investment. The recipient country gets an infusion of
capital into agriculture, leading to economic development.
For this to truly be a win-win arrangement, however, it is
imperative that the investor country is protected from
expropriation or nationalization. It is also imperative that
the recipient country's citizens are protected from labor
abuses and losses of their own food security.
Countries can also invest in the infrastructure used to
produce, store, and transport food abroad. This could be
permanent infrastructure, such as ports, silos, and roads;
mobile infrastructure, such as boats, trucks, and inputs such
as fertilizer; or intellectual infrastructure, such as patents to
seed varieties and other technologies. Buying land may be
unnecessary if an investor can supply and control the
infrastructure and technology necessary to produce, trans-
port, and store the food. The recipient would still benefit
from higher productivity of land and labor. The investor
would have its capital less tied up, and both parties would
avoid the political risks associated with land purchase. The
Gulf countries would benefit from this strategy, because
they would create supply-chain synergies if they both
produced oil and controlled the primary production factors
dependent on petroleum. If these assets are properly
diversified, they also minimize the problems associated
with weather and political risk. Bonded warehouses could be
constructed in Arab countries, allowing the physical stores
tied to international commodity markets to reside inside the
region. This would reduce apprehension about purchasing
hedges tied to physical wheat located at distant terminal
markets and would encourage more trading of the commodity.
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